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The MiFID Metamorphosis 
Karel Lannoo and Diego Valiante 
he Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID), adopted by the EU in April 2004 and 
implemented at Member State level by the end of 
2007, has begun to achieve real success in transforming the 
EU’s securities markets landscape. Judging from market 
data and sector publications, the Directive contributed to a 
revolution in trading methods and huge investments in 
technology, which have brought the EU and US markets 
closer together. Technology-driven systems, such as 
algorithmic trading and smart-order routing, have become 
the mainstream in trading process, with speed of trading and 
reduction of ‘latency’ being the key objectives. Large 
investments in market infrastructures are trying to strike the 
right balance between high capacity and speed, and low 
operational and technological risks that represent a future 
threat for these platforms, even in the post-trading space. 
Work remains to be done, however, on the ‘conduct of 
business’ side of the Directive, which is especially 
appropriate in a post-crisis context, but requires better 
enforcement. EU policy-makers should assess how the 
benefits of increased competition are passed on to end-users 
and how increased transparency has improved the quality of 
the price formation process. These elements could be the 
starting point of the MiFID Review, on which the European 
Commission will embark in the course of 2010. 
The origins and (r)evolution of the trading 
landscape 
It is worth recalling that MiFID’s ‘birth’ was not 
particularly well received. A long debate ensued over 
whether there was a need for a radical overhaul, or whether 
limited amendments to the 1993 Investment Services 
Directive (ISD) would be sufficient. The adoption of the 
proposal by the European Commission in 2002 was 
overshadowed by a last minute ‘Prodi amendment’ on pre-
trade transparency, which was also the main focus of the 
discussions in the European Parliament. The 
implementation of the Directive was seen to be painful, 
costly and complex – “Most Institutions Find It Difficult” – 
and the starting date was formally postponed. Many firms 
were not prepared for the directive on the already belated 
implementation date of November 2007, but also many 
member states seriously delayed transposing the EU 
Directive into national law.
1  
The tide started to turn in 2007, when at least some started 
to see MiFID as an opportunity as well. The UK’s Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) worked hard to make sure that the 
City would be ready and well prepared for the MiFID 
deadline. However, that date fell directly in the first months 
of the financial crisis, and the first 18-month period 
following the start date was entirely overshadowed by the 
problems in the banking sector. MiFID was a non-event, 
even if many of the conduct-of-business provisions of the 
Directive were well adapted in the post-crisis context. 
Important changes in market structure occurred in the 
course of 2009. MTFs – with their pan-European trading 
venues – began to gain an increasing market share to the 
detriment of the exchanges. Before MiFID, fragmentation 
was mainly driven by geographical and behavioural factors 
(e.g. home bias), even where the concentration rule did not 
apply. Under the new regime, new entrants managed to get a 
market share of about 20% of total trading in Europe by the 
end of 2009, from almost nothing the year before. Chi-X, 
the most successful new entrant, managed to become the 4
th 
most important operator in the European trading landscape 
in 2009, just behind Deutsche Börse. The market share of 
the largest regulated market in the EU, the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE), shrank from 35% to 24% from 2008 to 
2009 (see Figure 1).  
 
                                                        
1 See Casey & Lannoo (2009, pp. 12-13) for an overview of the costs 
estimates of implementing MiFID and Lannoo (2007) for an overview 
of the state of preparedness for implementation in 2007 (text available 
on www.eurocapitalmarkets.org and www.ceps.eu ). 
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Figure 1. EU equity markets – 2009 market shares 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters, FESE (December 2009; % total turnover). 
Figure 2. Market Share of trading venues on the FTSE 100 
 
Source: BATS Europe. 
Within the local stock market indexes, for instance on the 
FTSE 100, the LSE currently has a market share of about 
60%, down from over 80% a year ago (see Figure 2). 
Estimates reduce this market share to 40% by 2012.
2 
This revolutionary change happened in a context of sharp 
declines on Europe’s stock markets and the consequent 
dramatic reduction in the turnover of Europe’s trading 
venues, and thus also exchange revenues. Sudden losses 
have hit exchanges’ balance sheets, forcing them to rethink 
their business models and to diversify into other revenue 
                                                        
2 See Bruce Hamilton, presentation at ECMI Conference on “MiFID 
& EU Markets: What is next ?” (http://www.eurocapitalmarkets.org/ 
system/files/Bruce+Hamilton.pdf).  
streams. Specialised services in the realm of market data 
and new infrastructures run as MTF platforms with dark and 
lit pools of liquidity are the main targets of this 
diversification process.
3 Hence, on the one side, as a result 
of fierce competition, exchanges are building their own dark 
and lit pan-European platforms that are progressively 
competing with newcomers on a cross-border level. On the 
other hand, however, the market for data remains costly and 
highly segmented by incumbents and data vendors, which 
                                                        
3 LSE Group has just completed the acquisition of Turquoise (18 
February 2010) and it will merge its MTF Baikal with the purchased 
trading venue. Euronext created Smartpool and purchased NYFIX 
technologies with Euro-Millennium dark pool, which has been shut 
down. Deutsche Börse is running its own dark and lit MTF platforms. The MiFID Metamorphosis |3 
are benefiting from the lack of standardisation for data 
formats. Without a harmonised framework of formats and 
pro-competitive practices, final products (market data) are 
not homogeneous and competition cannot really be 
unleashed into the market. More should be done to disclose 
market data “in a manner which is easily accessible [and 
readable] to other market participants” (Art. 28 MiFID). 
On the competition policy side, in effect, widespread 
bundling practices may create unfair advantages for large 
market players and final users. The obligation to purchase 
bundled services or data products without the possibility to 
buy the product separately favours incumbents and 
maintains market segmentation. A clear-cut example is the 
practice to bundle broker, execution and other trading and 
(potentially) post-trading services. The Turquoise project 
(see figure below) represents an example of bundling that 
will, thanks to the merger with the LSE, potentially allow 
this market participant to offer all services related to a 
transaction in equity markets, especially if the LSE decides 
to enter the market also for post-trading services in the UK 
through its Italian subsidiaries, Monte Titoli and CC&G.  
Figure 3. Turquoise’s TQ Lens 
 
Source: Turquoise trading. 
This project is an interesting innovation that may reduce 
costs of access and intermediation while increasing the 
quality of the transaction at the same time. In effect, 
bundling of services can create high economies of scale and 
scope. From a competition policy point of view, this 
bundling solution does not necessarily harm final investors 
if investors are free to choose single services from the 
bundle with no lock-in effects for final users and the bundle 
does not foreclose new entrants. If the market participant 
that offers the bundle is not dominant and if the bundle is 
potentially replicable and the offer does not involve loyalty 
rebates, foreclosure effects are generally low.
4 
A similar and even more pronounced market trend can 
beobserved in the US, where the abolishment of order 
protection for manual quotations in Reg NMS (Regulation 
National Market System) and the rule against trade-
throughs
5 have led to a dramatic reduction in the market 
                                                        
4 See, in general, CEPS and Van Djik Consultants (2009) at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/tying/ 
report_en.pdf.  
5 “A trade-through occurs when one trading center executes an order 
at a price that is inferior to the price of a protected quotation, often 
representing an investor limit order, displayed by another trading 
center.” SEC, “Regulation NMS”, Release No. 34-51808; File No. S7-
10-04, p. 22. 
share of the New York Stock Exchange. In January 2005, 
NYSE executed 79.1% of the consolidated share volume in 
its listed stocks, compared to 27.4% in December 2009 (see 
SEC, 2010 and Figure 4). But so far, the increased 
fragmentation of trading venues has not deteriorated orderly 
price formation. Spreads at the larger European and US 
exchanges have further narrowed in the course of 2009.  
Securities markets in the EU and the US have thus started to 
move in parallel. Whereas the main European exchanges 
have had automated trade matching in place since the early 
1990s, the US continued to protect manual quotations until 
the entry into force of Reg NMS. The EU, on the other 
hand, still maintained the monopoly of exchanges until the 
entry into force of MiFID in November 2007, whereas in the 
US Automated Trading Systems (ATS) have been 
competing with the main markets since the mid-1990s. Both 
regulations – Reg NMS and MiFID – aim at increasing 
market efficiency and reducing trading costs through 
creating fiercer competition between trading venues. An 
exact comparison between Europe and the US is difficult 
because of poor data quality, however.  
Within Europe, an intense debate is on between the 
European exchanges (FESE) and investment banks 
concerning the size of over-the-counter broker-dealer 
networks (or ‘crossing engines’). In effect, the MiFID 
revolution, especially with the introduction of new 
technologies, has caused the emergence of trading venues as 
a result of new pre-trade transparency requirements and 
their missing classification under the Directive. Crossing 
engines apply discretionary rules in the selection of liquidity 
(as systematic internalisers), but they do not apply pre-trade 
transparency, as they deal with liquidity that may have 
market impact. Until now, there is no evidence that these 
pools of liquidity have negatively impacted price formation 
(see for example CFA, 2009). Besides, they are systemically 
irrelevant.
6 However, in a recent consultation paper, CESR 
has proposed a legal classification for broker-dealer crossing 
networks and detailed post-trade reporting to authorities, 
plus the requirement of becoming MTF if the amount of 
client business exceeds a certain threshold (CESR, 2010b). 
We agree on the need to give a legal classification and 
proper post-trade data requirements to these venues, but we 
do not concur with the solution of setting a threshold, at 
least as long as we do not have empirical evidence of the 
optimal size or the level of over-the-counter trading that 
affects price formation. The discussion should be guided by 
other priorities, as we explain below. 
                                                        
6 The FSA calculates that broker dealer crossing networks account for 
1.25% of the total trading (see Jeremy Grant, “Bank dark pools only 
1.25% of Europe trading”, FT.com, 16 December 2009 at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/57423724-ea6d-11de-a9f5-
0144feab49a.html). CESR (2010) has recently calculated the size of 
these crossing networks as 1.4% of the total EEA trading. 
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Figure 4. US equity markets – 2009 market shares 
 
Source: TABB Group (December 2009). 
In conclusion, a similar trend can be observed in the EU and 
the US towards fragmentation driven by competition, even 
though market integration in Europe still has some way to 
go. Legal, fiscal and behavioural barriers prevent greater 
and more cost-effective competition at European level.  
New technologies: Impact on execution services 
and market structure 
With the liberalisation of market access and an 
improvement in service choice, trading venues and broker-
dealers have invested massively in technology to accelerate 
trade execution and improve capacity. The NYSE’s speed of 
execution for small, immediately executable orders was 10.1 
seconds in January 2005, compared to 0.7 seconds in 
October 2009. NYSE Euronext Paris will move its servers 
to London to reduce latency and to be closer to the main 
trading community in Europe, while the LSE Group – after 
the acquisition of the IT firm Millennium – is launching a 
new infrastructure called ‘Millennium Exchange’, to which 
Oslo Bors is also going to migrate in April 2010.
7 Banks are 
continuously developing and fine-tuning their order-routing 
systems to be ahead of the competition. Quantitative 
automated trading strategies, such as smart order routing 
and algorithmic trading, have become mainstream in trade 
execution. Among these quantitative strategies, high 
frequency trading has become a more significant component 
of the market, and the success of this strategy has 
encouraged more entrants. 
The impact of new technologies has benefited displayed 
order books (hereinafter, ‘lit order books’) and dark order 
books, and their mechanisms of price formation. As we can 
see from Figure 5, the comparison of pre- and post-MiFID 
scenarios in the UK FTSE 100 – which applied OTC 
reporting even before MiFID – shows a dramatic fall in the 
turnover and number of OTC trades (off-order book) and a 
big rise in the number of on-order book trades, while the 
turnover is more or less the same. On-order books, in effect 
                                                        
7 See http://www.londonstockexchange.com/traders-and-brokers/ 
products-services/millennium-exchange/millennium-exchange-
migration/millennium-exchange-migration.htm and 
http://www.thetradenews.com/trading-venues/exchanges/4192.  
– despite the terrible course of the financial crisis – the 
normalised turnover is slightly declining while the number 
of trades soared, also taking into account a normal drop in 
liquidity and investments due to the crisis. In our view, this 
result can be ascribed as an important positive result 
achieved by MiFID because on order books – where prices 
are formed – have largely benefited from the new trading 
environment. 
This structural shift is due to the introduction of electronic 
trading (such as algorithmic trading), which reduces market 
impact. Market impact itself has become a more significant 
variable in investment decisions with the use of new trading 
technologies that permit one to more easily sniff out new 
sources of liquidity. These new systems of trading execution 
slice big orders into many small orders, designing a 
trajectory for the orders that will be executed at different 
points during the trading day. In effect, the average size of 
orders went down drastically in Europe, for instance on the 
LSE FTSE 100 from £21,000 in 2003 to almost £10,000 in 
2008 (CESR, 2009).  
 
  
 
Figure 5. London Stock Exchange – FTSE 100 
On Order Book On Order Book Off Order Book Off Order Book
2006 2009 2006 2009
Trades 78,246,360 251,077,643 16,553,175 9,630,555
Turnover (€mln‐right axis) € 1,927,888 € 1,743,471.69 € 3,283,840 € 1,408,405
€0
€ 500,000
€ 1,000,000
€ 1,500,000
€ 2,000,000
€ 2,500,000
€ 3,000,000
€ 3,500,000
0
50,000,000
100,000,000
150,000,000
200,000,000
250,000,000
300,000,000
‐57.11%
+220.88%
‐41.82%
‐9.57%
 
Source: FESE, Thomson Reuters, Markit BOAT, Chi-X, BATS Europe (turnover normalised by drop in FTSE 100 index 
value from January 2006 to December 2009 [13%]). 
 
Best execution: Laying out the road for a 
consolidated EBBO 
Automated trading strategies are specially driven by 
regulatory conduct of business requirements, such as best 
execution. Well-programmed systems will be more capable 
of delivering best execution than manual systems, provided 
the criteria are clearly set. On this account, the US Reg 
NMS is clearer than the EU’s MiFID, as best execution is 
price only in the US, with a strict prohibition of trade-
throughs, whereas the EU rule is more loosely defined, and 
may need tightening. Hence, narrowing of the rules in the 
EU for investor protection reasons will further automate 
trading, but not necessarily at the expense of the main 
markets if they adapt trading fees and costs for end-users. 
The MiFID implementation has highlighted some further 
problems, related not only to a loose definition, but 
primarily to bad enforcement in particular for retail 
investors. In effect, while dark books – where big size 
orders are traded – have kept their size as before the crisis, 
lit books of regulated markets and MTFs – where retail 
investors and funds represent a big part – have lost a 
relevant share of turnover in the last two years (CESR, 
2010b). In addition, the automatic splitting of orders in 
smart order routing and matching on banks’ own books 
often mean that certain criteria for systemic internalisation 
of MiFID are not met. 
As shown in Figure 6, 12.6% of trades on FTSE 100 in 
December 2009 missed the best price on the incumbent 
exchange (this number becomes 18.2% for the CAC 40 and 
21.5% for Xetra). If we consider that under MiFID best 
execution for retail investors is mainly price and cost, this 
number gives evidence of the bad quality of execution for 
retail investors who mainly invest through systems only 
linked with incumbents and do not access advanced 
technologies. 
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Figure 6. Proportion of trades that missed the best price – December 2009 
 
Source: Orange LFA Viewer - Equiduct Systems. 
Figure 7. Incumbent market’s market share under best execution routing – December 2009 
 
Source: Orange LFA Viewer - Equiduct Systems. 
 
The cost opportunity for retail investors to invest in the 
most liquid shares through another trading venue, only in 
January, was more than €12 million (see Table 1). If we 
add fixed costs, the cost opportunity of the execution grows 
even more. 
In effect, overall costs to access several trading venues and 
to provide a consolidated view are still prohibitive for the 
majority of investors (which are retail investors and funds). 
Access to new technologies allowing consolidated pan-
European trading is only provided to a small part of the 
market, i.e. to some professional investors who are able to 
bear the high costs of access. Data costs and fragmented 
data markets do not support the development of these 
technologies at low costs. On the one side, data feed 
providers by regulation (exchanges) are trying to subsidise 
losses due to new acquisitions and competition by other 
trading venues. Therefore, sources of revenues – as data 
fees – are kept stable while demand for more specialised 
services is obviously increasing. In addition, the accuracy 
of data is quite low, especially when transactions involve 
several players. On the other hand, however, the lack of 
standardisation (formats, identifiers, etc.) does allow data 
vendors and distributors to maintain market fragmentation 
through the use of different formats. 
The use of bundled fees for data, in addition, helps to keep 
prices stable and markets segmented as long as different 
formats prevent the product from being homogeneous.
8 
The artificial non-homogeneity of data allows the 
proliferation of bundled services on products that are 
technically homogeneous and highly complementary. In 
this regard, there is space for market competition in order 
to push down fees and costs for final users. Competition by 
newcomers is confined to new specialised services and for 
                                                        
8 There is an important flow of literature assessing the potential risk 
to foreclose competition through bundling complementary services. 
For a review of the literature on bundling, see Centre for European 
Policy Studies (CEPS) and Van Djik Consultants (2009).  The MiFID Metamorphosis |7 
a niche of the demand (providers of investment services 
with low-demand elasticity for trading data), since the costs 
are prohibitive for a large part of the demand (providers of 
investment services with high-demand elasticity, such as 
the ones providing services for retail investors). 
 
Table 1. Recent statistics (January 2010 on the 1,000 + most liquid stocks – Europe 
  
Most liquid 
stocks in Europe   FTSE 100   CAC 40   DAX 30  
Traded volume   €341.22 Bn  €122.30 Bn  €77.26 Bn  €61.32  Bn 
Number of trades  48.08  Mn  17.80  Mn  9.52  Mn  5.40  Mn  
45.38 Bn  14.36  Bn  11.13  Bn  9.14  Bn  
Volume missing the best available price  
13.30%   11.74%   14.40%   14.90%  
5.37 Mn  1.84  Mn  1.23  Mn  0.70  Mn   Number of trades missing the best 
available price   11.2%   10.4%   12.9%   13.0%  
Opportunity costs   €12.38 Mn   €4.00 Mn   €2.5 Mn   €1.65 Mn  
Potential average price improvement  3.3  Bps  3.5  Bps  2.5  Bps  2.4  Bps  
Source: Orange LFA Viewer – Equiduct Systems. 
As shown in Table 2, unbundling of services and fees 
supported by standardised data formats – thus opening 
market to competition – would sensibly reduce fees in order 
to make access to data cheaper and easier. In this 
competitive environment, market-led consolidated solutions 
may have easier access to data than policy-led solutions.  
Table 2. Bundled v. unbundled fees 
 
Market 
share 
€ Bundled 
fee 
(per month/ 
per user) 
€ Unbundled 
fee (per 
month/per 
user) 
Chi-X  6% 0  0 
Nasdaq OMX   5% 22  4 
Spanish 
exchanges  5% 34  7 
Markit 
BOAT   24% 40  8 
LSE  21% 42  8 
Deutsche 
Börse  8% 56  11 
Euronext  21% 59  12 
Other venues 
(estimation)  10% 250  50 
TOTAL  100% 503  100 
Source: Markit. 
Unbundling and standardised data formats will allow 
consolidated post or pre-trade data solutions. A priority in 
the MiFID review is to bring back retail investors and funds 
to EU capital markets. Reinforcing investor protection 
through enforcing retail best execution on a pan-European 
basis can only be delivered through a market-led European 
Best Bid and Offer (EBBO). Despite the importance of 
having consolidated pre-trade data solutions more easily 
accessible, the debate, pushed by sell-side and big buy-side 
representatives, is turning once again towards market 
efficiency and leaving the question of how to restore retail 
investors’ confidence on a cross-border level unanswered. 
Focusing on a more effective investor protection – through 
the real implementation of best execution duties – may put 
MiFID ahead within the measures promoting recovery for 
European capital markets after the crisis.  
In effect, the role of regulators should focus on restoring 
investors’ confidence and the efficient market functioning, 
bringing back liquidity into the market in order to generate 
new investment opportunities and pushing economic 
growth. Therefore, after years of debate on market 
efficiency, the attention in our view should aim towards 
boosting liquidity and promoting a pan-European equity 
market. A more efficient price discovery can help to make 
links within the internal market stronger to achieve the 
above-mentioned targets. There is no evidence that price 
formation has been harmed by MiFID (or by the low quality 
of post-trade data) and the financial crisis, while investor 
protection duties, such as best execution and price discovery 
(but also conduct of business duties), are being poorly 
performed across Europe, fostering investors’ distrust in a 
pan-European market. 
Figure 8. The impact of pre-trade and post-trade 
consolidated solutions 
Pre‐trade 
consolidated 
information
Post‐trade 
consolidated 
information
Best 
Execution
Market 
Efficiency
Main Impact Positive Effects
‐ Price Discovery
‐ Competition
‐ Investor Protection
‐ Price Formation
‐ Transparency
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
Turning to the post-trade information, the transparency and 
quality of data seem to constitute the major concerns. The 
accuracy, reliability and granularity of post-trade data are 
very low, even though MiFID introduced for the first time 
post-trade transparency for OTC trades in such countries as 
Germany. Action is needed to ameliorate the quality of post-
trade information. Common symbols (identifiers, etc.), low 8 | Lannoo & Valiante 
latency and a common message format are the priorities to 
be addressed by the uniform data format. Improving the 
quality of post-trade reporting is important in order to 
increase market efficiency and should be pushed by 
regulators in the short run; nevertheless, we do not think 
that post-trade consolidated solutions should be addressed 
through a regulatory action. Once the quality of data is 
improved, consolidating post-trade data will be a normal 
market outcome from competition in the market for post-
trade data, which is already providing consolidated views. 
Instead, opening the market for data to competition and 
improving price discovery (delivering benefits of 
competition to final users through best execution and pre-
trade consolidated solutions) shall be the priorities of the 
European Commission and CESR in the MiFID Review. 
In conclusion, the Directive’s know-your-customer rules 
(e.g. execution policies) and conflict of interest provisions 
seem to be applied in a ‘static’ way.
9 The recent proposals 
to transform CESR into a fully fledged European Security 
and Markets Authority (ESMA) will undoubtedly add a 
great deal to ensure that the rules are interpreted consistently 
and applied evenly across Europe. But it will also mean that 
new rules can be enacted much more rapidly. 
The review 
The MiFID review should not modify the basic principles 
set out in the 2004 text but only clarify some definitions and 
analyse the possibility of extending pre- and post-trade 
transparency requirements to other venues and asset classes 
(Art. 65, MiFID). The issues to be addressed can be 
subdivided into two areas: regulation and market practices. 
On the regulatory side, some issues for the review need an 
urgent answer. 
1.  A classification for broker-crossing networks is needed. 
Once it is recognised that these networks perform a 
different task from the other trading venues, they should 
be classified as a sort of systematic internaliser with 
pre-trade transparency waivers, since they deal with 
selected liquidity (applying discretionary rules). 
However, the benefit of applying discretionary rules 
and pre-trade transparency waivers should be offset 
with stricter economic and transparency/reporting 
requirements for such infrastructures.  
2.  The definition for certain waivers should be adapted 
(e.g. the large in scale order waiver) and the definition 
of standard market size needs to be updated. In effect, 
reducing the ‘volatility’ of definitions – due to the direct 
link with the average size of orders – may be an 
efficient method to preserve legal texts from pro-
cyclical effects.  
3.  There is a need for stricter best execution requirements 
and consolidated pre-trade transparency. The latter, in 
effect, is only accessed by professional investors able to 
pay the excessive costs of sophisticated technologies 
(e.g. smart order routing systems), while retail investors 
                                                        
9 See the forthcoming ECMI survey on MiFID ‘real’ implementation 
(preliminary results available at 
http://www.eurocapitalmarkets.org/node/441).  
receive a low quality execution in terms of price and 
costs. A push is needed to restore confidence in this side 
of the market, which represents a major source of 
liquidity in financial markets. A consolidated pre-trade 
solution – preferably industry-led but with a strong push 
from regulators – may also boost competition between 
market-makers in order to improve the quality of 
execution and reduce the costs for final users.  
4.  The quality of post-trade reporting should be improved. 
The granularity and reliability of post-trade data are still 
very low. This situation does not allow for an efficient 
definition of trading strategies and verification of best 
execution. However, this does not imply that a 
consolidated tape (post-trade data) should be addressed 
as the priority. The quality of post-trade reporting 
should be improved as such. Consolidated solutions will 
emerge by themselves when this target has been 
accomplished.  
On market practices, European capital markets lack a 
competitive market for data and selling practices.  
1.  Unbundling data services and standardising formats are 
of paramount importance in order to remove market 
segmentation and reduce costs at data generation and 
distribution levels. In effect, data costs and formats at 
the source and their distribution make consolidated pre- 
and post-trade solutions extremely costly. Industry 
should take an initiative, but regulatory action is needed 
to promote unbundling of services and products. 
2.  Selling practices need to be addressed by competition 
authorities, as conduct of business rules are limited to 
the perimeter of the single transaction of the investment 
firm with its customer. These rules do not permit an 
assessment of whether the practice is competitive and 
enhances consumer welfare, in a market where high 
switching costs often lock customers into expensive 
transactions and market structure does not allow an easy 
entrance for newcomers.  
Conclusions 
MiFID may have received rather perfunctory attention in the 
midst of the several reviews undertaken of the pre-crisis 
financial rules, but the analysis in this Policy Brief 
demonstrates that the Directive has been remarkably 
successful in terms of improving market structure and 
efficiency, although progress should be made on investor 
protection and conduct of business rules. Its initial objective 
has largely been met: to introduce more competition 
between trading venues, while maintaining an orderly price 
formation process. The upcoming MiFID review should 
therefore take a ‘light touch’, clarifying some definitions 
and extending price transparency to related segments of 
securities markets. The biggest priority is to improve pre- 
and post-trade transparency, but this should essentially be 
initiated by the industry, under pressure of regulators. More 
integrated price transparency solutions will also allow end-
users to fully participate in the changes brought about by 
MiFID, restoring investors’ trust and pushing more liquidity 
in equity markets. The start of ESMA then should allow for 
better enforcement of the conduct of business rules. The MiFID Metamorphosis |9 
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